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‘Suffering’ is a central discursive trope for the right-to-die movement. In this article, we ask how pro-
ponents of physician-assisted dying (PAD) articulate suffering with the role of medicine at the end of life
within the context of a decriminalization and legalization debate. We draw upon empirical data from our
study of Carter v. Canada, the landmark court case that decriminalized PAD in Canada in 2015. We
conducted in-depth interviews with 42 key participants of the case and collected over 4000 pages of
legal documents generated by the case. In our analysis of the data, we show the different ways pro-
ponents construct relationships between suffering, mainstream curative medicine, palliative care, and
assisted dying. Proponents see curative medicine as complicit in the production of suffering at the end of
life; they lament a cultural context wherein life-prolongation is the moral imperative of physicians who
are paternalistic and death-denying. Proponents further limit palliative care's ability to alleviate suffering
at the end of life and even go so far as to claim that in some instances, palliative care produces suffering.
Proponents' articulation of suffering with both mainstream medicine and palliative care might suggest
an outright rejection of a place for medicine at the end of life. We further ﬁnd, however, that proponents
insist on the involvement of physicians in assisted dying. Proponents emphasize how a request for PAD
can set in motion an interactive therapeutic process that alleviates suffering at the end of life. We argue
that the proponents' articulation of suffering with the role of medicine at the end of life should be
understood as a discourse through which one conﬁguration of end-of-life care comes to be accepted and
another rejected, a discourse that ultimately does not challenge, but makes productive use of the larger
framework of the medicalization of dying.
Crown Copyright © 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).This is a momentous occasion, for my clients, for society, for this
court. This case quite simply concerns matters of life and death.
It may require the court…to determine if the state has the right
to require family members, our friends, ourselves to endure
intolerable suffering as a result of a medical conditionwhen that
suffering is worse than life itself.
Joseph Arvay, At the Supreme Court of Canada, October 15, 2014. Karsoho), jennifer.ﬁshman@
. Wright), mary.macdonald@
vier Ltd. This is an open access art1. Introduction
Lead counsel for the claimants in Carter v. Canada, Joseph Arvay,
uttered the above as part of his opening statement to the Supreme
Court of Canada (SCC). Carter was landmark litigation that chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code prohibitions on
physician-assisted dying (PAD; euthanasia and physician-assisted
suicide). Less than four months after the hearing, the Justices
released a unanimous decision striking down the prohibitions on
PAD, giving the federal government a limited window of time to
revise the law. On June 17, 2016, the Parliament passed legislation
on PAD. Canada is now one of a growing number of countries in
which the practice is legal.
Arvay's statement above highlights the centrality of suffering as
a discursive trope in the right-to-die movement. Indeed, Scherer
and Simon (1999) have identiﬁed ‘suffering’ along withicle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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proponents of PAD. Considerations of suffering in the right-to-die
movement, however, cannot be divorced from discussions about
the role and place of medicine at the end of life. As Lavi (2001)
argues, the right-to-die movement must be properly seen “in the
medical context in which it arises and primarily as a solution to the
problem of pain in dying” (p. 138). Implicit, too, in Arvay's state-
ment is an indictment on medicine's failure to adequately address
suffering. This article therefore aims to investigate how proponents
articulate suffering with the role of medicine, particularly in the
end-of-life context. We use ‘articulate’ to mean the process of
forming discursive linkages between two different entities or
concepts. In other words, how do the proponents construct the
relationship between suffering and medical interventions at the
end of life? This requires us to grapple with such questions as:
What do the proponents identify as the primary causes of suffering
at the end of life? Inwhat ways do they suggest medicine, including
palliative care, is (un)successful in addressing suffering? In the
context of PAD, how do the proponents conceive the role of med-
icine in addressing suffering?
In order to answer these questions, we draw upon a set of
original, empirical data from our investigation of Carter v. Canada.
We begin by describing Carter in greater detail. We then describe
two social phenomena that others have identiﬁed as transformative
of the contemporary dying experience: the increasing use of life-
extending interventions in mainstream curative medicine and the
emergence and rise of palliative care as the paradigmatic end-of-
life care modality. This description serves two purposes: to pro-
vide readers with necessary context for many claims advanced by
Carter's proponents and to serve as a basis for discussion of our
empirical data in the last section of the article. We then proceed to
describe our studymethods. In our reporting of results, we ﬁnd that
proponents see curative medicine as complicit in the production of
suffering at the end of life. Proponents draw limits around the
ability of palliative care to relieve suffering; they further contend
that in some instances, palliative care can actually produce addi-
tional suffering. At the same time, proponents insist that physicians
must be involved in any legal regime of assisted dying. Thus, we
also ﬁnd that proponents emphasize how a request for PAD can set
in motion an interactive medical process that has the potential to
alleviate suffering at the end of life. In the discussion section, we
argue that proponents' articulation of suffering with the role of
medicine constitutes a discourse through which different conﬁg-
urations of end-of-life care come to be rejected or accepted within
the larger framework of the medicalization of dying.
2. Background
2.1. Contextualizing Carter v. Canada
Political efforts to legalize PAD date back to the late nineteenth
century (Dowbiggin, 2002; Lavi, 2007). It was not until 1997,
however, that the ﬁrst law on physician-assisted suicide (PAS) went
into effect, in Oregon. Thereafter, a quick succession of other
medico-legal regimes appeared, including Netherlands in 2002 and
recently California in December 2015. Although euthanasia is an
ancient topic (Van Hooff, 2004), PAD as a medicolegal practice
accessible to the public at large is a relatively recent phenomenon.
There are now 13 jurisdictions, including Canada, that have
decriminalized or legalized PAD.
Carter v. Canada is a watershed moment in the history of the
global right-to-die movement. With Carter, Canada became only
the second country in theworld, after Colombia, to have allowed for
PAD on constitutional grounds. Moreover, Carter decriminalized not
only PAS but also, for the ﬁrst time in North America, euthanasia.The case began in the Supreme Court of British Columbia (the
province's court of ﬁrst instance) in 2011. It was then heard at the
British Columbia Court of Appeal in 2012, and ﬁnally the country's
highest court in 2014. The claimants included Lee Carter and her
husband Hollis Johnson, Gloria Taylor, William Shoichet, and the
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA). Carter and
Johnson had accompanied Carter's mother to die at an assisted
suicide clinic in Switzerland the previous year, an event that they
made public immediately afterward. Taylor was a woman with
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) and Shoichet was a family
physician. The diversity of the claimants was meant to reﬂect the
diversity of persons with stakes in the legalization of PAD.
The Carter claimants challenged the Canadian Criminal Code
prohibitions on assisting in another person's suicide and on con-
senting to one's death. The claimants' legal arguments essentially
advanced along the lines of autonomy and equality. The autonomy
argument stated that ill patients ought to have the right to seek PAD
in order to control the manner and time of their own dying. The
equality argument stated that since attempting suicide was not a
crime, the ban on assisting suicide had the discriminatory effect of
preventing disabled persons incapable of suicide from taking their
own lives. The SCC eventually agreed with the claimants' autonomy
argument and having done so, found it unnecessary to adjudicate
the matter in terms of equality (for more details on the ruling, see
Karsoho, 2015).
The right-to-die movement, like other social movements,
developed within a socio-historical context that both enabled and
constrained what could be accomplished by the proponents. In the
rest of the section, we discuss in brief two important social phe-
nomena that have radically transformed the dying experience in
contemporary times: the growing use of life-prolonging technolo-
gies in mainstream medicine and the emergence of palliative care.
Many authors see these phenomena as constituting the larger
process of the medicalization of dying and intersecting with the
right-to-die movement in signiﬁcant ways.
2.2. Mainstream curative medicine and the extension of life
Mainstream curative medicine is now ever more reliant on the
sciences and technologies (Clarke et al., 2003). For persons nearing
the end of life, such “technoscientization of biomedical practices”
(Clarke et al., 2010) manifests itself in the normalization and
routinization of life-extending technologies (Kaufman et al., 2004;
Shim et al., 2006). These life-prolonging technologies have created
new forms of dying (e.g., neurovegetative state) and at the same
time remade the moral frameworks at the end of life (Kaufman,
2005; Kaufman and Morgan, 2005).
In Kaufman's (2015) incisive ethnography on “ordinary medi-
cine,” she notes how the biomedical research industry is producing
evidence of effective therapies at historically unprecedented rate.
Many of these therapies (e.g., implantable cardiac deﬁbrillator)
were originally intended as last resort options. Once insurable,
however, they become standard care and “ethically necessary and
therefore difﬁcult, if not impossible, for physicians, patients, and
families to refuse” (Kaufman, 2015, p. 7). Indeed, refusing these
potentially life-prolonging therapies seems irrational or even
downright morally wrong in a cultural context in which death is
seen as bad. The problem then is that “few know when that line
between life-giving therapies and too much treatment is about to
be crossed…the widespread lament about where that line is
located and what to do about it grows ever louder” (Kaufman, 2015,
p. 2). The use of life-extending technologies reproduces and, at the
same time, is made possible by the organising principle of main-
stream medicine: the (mistaken) belief that life can be prolonged
more or less indeﬁnitely throughmedical interventions, a pervasive
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longevism” and which they view as producing more harms than
beneﬁts to persons at the end of life.
2.3. The rise of palliative care
Public concerns about the medical care of the dying in the
developed world began to surface in the 1950s when systematic
studies revealed the neglect of dying patients and under-treatment
of their symptoms (Clark, 2002, 2007). These concerns about care
of the dying were taken upmost notably by Cicely Saunders, who is
widely acknowledged to be the founder of the modern hospice
movement. Saunders founded the ﬁrst modern hospice, St. Chris-
topher's Hospice, in London, UK, in 1967 (Saunders, 2000). The
success of St. Christopher's, together with Saunders' proliﬁc writing
contributed to the development of “a new approach to the care of
dying people which would harness together medical innovation in
pain and symptom management with wider concerns for the
practical and social needs of patients and families, as well as
responsiveness to spiritual matters” (Clark and Seymour, 1999, p.
72). One of Saunders' most important intellectual contributions to
medical knowledge and practice is the concept of ‘total pain,’which
argues that suffering is irreducible to physical pain and must be
understood in its multiple dimensions: physical, psychological,
social, and spiritual. In order to relieve suffering, care for the dying
must therefore be similarly holistic (Clark, 1999).
The modern hospice movement quickly gained international
following. Balfour Mount, a Montreal urologist, coined and brought
the term ‘palliative care’ into wide usage, preferring its use to
‘hospice’ because in French the word ‘hospice’ referred to alms-
house (a house for the poor, not the dying) (Lewis, 2007). Knowl-
edge and practice of palliative care quickly spread to other
countries such that 115 of the world's 234 countries now have one
or more palliative care services (Clark, 2007). Palliative care, how-
ever, has not provided equal beneﬁts to all patients. The develop-
ment of palliative care is deeply rooted in oncology, “which has
shaped the conceptual model of palliative care, produced some of
its major leaders and innovators, and provided a population of
patients with the obvious potential to beneﬁt from a new approach
to themanagement of those with advanced disease” (Clark, 2007, p.
430). This means that cancer patients are more likely than patients
with other terminal illnesses to beneﬁt from palliative care (Clark,
2007).
The ethos of palliative care is typically portrayed as antagonistic
to the idea of PAD as an ethical EOLC practice (Bernheim et al.,
2008). Hermsen and ten Have (2002) analyze how PAD is dis-
cussed in palliative care journals and found that the “majority of the
examined articles do not consider euthanasia as an ethically legit-
imate act in the context of palliative care” (p. 524). Wright et al.
(2015) analyze the representation of physicians’ perspectives on
PAD in the Canadian print media and identify a palliative care
advocacy discourse whereby physicians who self-identify as part of
the palliative care community voice a strong and consistent mes-
sage of opposition to PAD. Reasons given for opposing PAD include,
but are not limited to, the ethical principle of respect for life, the
ability of palliative care interventions to address suffering, and
concern about the diversion of resources away from palliative care.
2.4. The medicalization of dying
The two phenomena just described attest to the ways in which
dying in Western societies has changed radically since the Middle
Ages. There are, of course, other processes (e.g., demographic
transition) that underlie the changes and these have been explored
elsewhere (see Aries, 1981; Kellehear, 2007; Seale, 1998; Walter,1994). Starting in the mid-twentieth century, however, changes in
dying are best characterised as medicalization (Howarth, 2007). As
Broom (2015, p. 6) argues, “[e]ssentially, dying frommedical illness
was gradually transformed over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury into a medical challenge not just an existential moment…
Increasingly medicalized, dying was drawn into various institutions
and viewed as a site of medical expertise and professional skill”
(emphases in the original).
The medicalization of dying is immediately self-evident when
one considers the use of life-prolonging interventions in main-
stream curative medicine. But what about palliative care? Some see
palliative care as a pointed critique on the medicalization of dying.
McNamara (2001) argues that palliative care “has the potential to
disrupt the medicalization of death” (p. 76) and “has served as a
symbolic critique of how dying people are managed in other
medical settings” (p. 121). Others, however, see palliative care as
contributing to the medicalization of dying. Broom (2015, p. 12), for
example, views palliative care as part of the overall trend of the
medicalization of dying: “Themedicalization of dyinge via hospice
and specialist palliative care … had the potential to reinforce the
cultural dispositions toward death, separating those who are dying
from the community and their families, and further concealing this
important point in the life course.” It is, of course, possible for
palliative care to be a medicalizing and, at the same time, deme-
dicalizing force. Indeed, Syme and Bruce (2009, p. 20) argue for a
view of palliative care as a “social movement that augmented and
opposedmainstream curative medicine as the hegemonic model of
care” (emphases added). Such view is supported by a historical
reading of Saunders’ original intentions: according to Clark and
Seymour (1999, p. 64), Saunders actually wanted to “improve and
extend medical care at the end of life. The debate of course was
around the precise form which this medicine should take” (em-
phases in the original).
The term ‘end-of-life care’ (EOLC) is best understood as a
conﬁguration of healthcare resources (i.e., people, practices, and
technologies) mobilized at the last phase of a person's life. While
palliative care has become the paradigmatic EOLC modality today
(Livne, 2014), it does not have a complete monopoly over EOLC.
According to Connelly (1998), there exist two dominant logics in
EOLC: on the one hand, there is the ‘dying well’ path inmedicine, as
represented, practiced, and promoted by palliative care pro-
fessionals. On the other hand, there is still the traditional ‘life-
saving’ path of medicine whereby treatment is directed at curing
the patient's disease; the goal is always to prolong life and comfort
care is secondary to this goal. For most dying individuals, then, the
medicalization of dying has come to mean that their last days of life
are strongly shaped by either or the interplay of these two EOLC
logics. For proponents of PAD, the medicalization of dying serves as
the platform from which to argue the moral imperative of new op-
tions in EOLC. In the results section, we will show how participants
in Carter v. Canada engaged both EOLC logics (the ‘dying well’ path
and the ‘life-saving’ path) as inadequate in addressing, and in some
cases even perpetuating, the fundamental problem of suffering in
dying.
3. Materials and methods
Carter v. Canada represents for us a “critical case” (Flyvbjerg,
2001) through which we can fruitfully investigate how PAD pro-
ponents articulate suffering with the role of medicine at the end of
life. A critical case is not the same as a representative or a typical
case; instead it is a case that is rich in information. Indeed, so
extensive was the scope of evidence and actors involved in Carter
that an Irish court in a subsequent PAD litigation noted that the
review conducted by the Canadian trial judge was “enormously
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(BAILII)]. By the time Carter reached the SCC, 97 witnesses and 26
interveners, along with the claimants, their legal counsels, and the
Crown Counsels had participated in the case. The expert witnesses
called on by the claimants and the government hailed from 7
different countries. The selection of a critical case is important if the
goal of analysis is to generalize not to other cases (i.e., statistical
generalisation) but to theory (Ruddin, 2006), as is our intent here.
Prior to data collection, the study received Institutional Review
Board approval fromMcGill University. The data we analyze consist
of all of the legal artefacts generated by the case (i.e., afﬁdavits, trial
transcripts, factums, court decisions), all amounting to over 4000
pages of texts, and in-depth interviews with key participants in the
case. The ﬁrst and third authors also attended the SCC hearing on
October 15, 2014 and took observational notes. Our selection of
interviews with participants is predicated upon the insight that not
all actors are created equal in a controversy (Venturini, 2010); we
therefore selected only those actors with the most impact in the
case: the claimants, interveners, and witnesses whose opinions
were cited by the judges in the case. In the case of the witnesses, for
each participant who did not respond, declined, or was lost to
follow up, we made sure to recruit another participant who could
speak to similar issues. Our recruitment process resulted in 42 in-
terviews. The interviews were designed to ‘speak’ directly to the
legal data; the interview guide for each participant was tailored
according to that participant's legal documents. Our participants
were interviewed either in person or over Skype. All interviews
were audio recorded and transcribed. Informed consent, either
written or verbal, was obtained from every participant. For those
participants who chose to remain anonymous, we identify only the
data source (e.g., interview, trial transcript). Those we name in this
article have given us permission at the time of interview to identify
them. Data collection for this article spanned 21 months from June
2013 to March 2015.
Analysis proceeded along an iterative process involving coding,
memo writing, and literature review. We began by uploading all of
the documents to Atlas.ti™. Karsoho then coded all of the docu-
ments both deductively, using themes derived from the literature,
and inductively for emergent themes. For this article, our analysis
was initially guided by an analytical interest in the role of medicine
in the debate over legalization of PAD. Karsoho reviewed all of the
codes pertaining to this issue; during this process, ‘medicalization’
and ‘suffering’ emerged as “core categories” (Strauss and Corbin,
1998). Further elucidation of the relationship between these cate-
gories occurred through memo writing and consultation with the
literature. This initial analysis was then presented to the co-authors
for multiple rounds of further analysis and clariﬁcation.
Our analytical approach to the data is guided by insights from
studies of discourse in sociology of knowledge. Following Potter
(1996), we understand discourse to be talk and text in action.
Discourse here is understood to be part of a broader repertoire of
human actions used to accomplish something. In order to under-
stand how talk and text do things, we have to consider their
“deployment in speciﬁc interactions and the nature of those in-
teractions (Potter, 1996, p. 180).” This understanding of discourse
guides our analysis in two interrelated ways. First, we interrogate
the practical nature of actors' text and talk, rather than its truth
value. That is, we are constantly asking, ‘what are our study par-
ticipants attempting to do here?’ What legal, moral, or political
aims are advanced by describing suffering in particular ways?
Second, we treat actors' discourse not as a resource but as a topic
(Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). In other words, we do not take the
words of our participants to be ‘true’ but attend to the ways in
which meaning is produced and to what effects. Therefore, pro-
ceeding from the assumption that language is “used to do things; itis amedium of action” (Potter,1996, p.11) allows us to bemindful of
the broader legal context in which our data is produced. We
approach the data not as evidence of a ‘true’ or ‘real’ perspective on
suffering and the role of medicine but rather as a strategic
deployment of language by the participants to advance speciﬁc
agenda.
In this article, we focus and present data on the proponents'
discourse; however, their discourse was necessarily constructed
vis-a-vis the opponents'. Thus, in a few places, we present data
from the opponents' discourse to provide greater clarity for readers.
Our use of the term ‘proponents’ or ‘opponents’ is not intended to
elide the diversity of opinions and positions within each ‘side’ in
the debate. We recognize that our study participants may differ in
the strength of their support for the claimants or the government.
By proponents, we mean the claimants and all of the actors (in-
terveners, witnesses) who are strategically enrolled by the claim-
ants to advance their case for decriminalization. Opponents refer to
all of the actors on the opposing side.
4. Results
Proponents’ discursive articulation of suffering occurs
throughout the data. Expressions of suffering are most common
amongste although not limited toe the claimants, lay afﬁants, and
those expert witnesses who professionally identify as physicians.
Lay afﬁants often speak about either their own illness or having
witnessed their loved ones die, using such adjectives as “horriﬁc,”
“heartbreaking,” and “torturous” to describe their experiences.
Physicians, on the other hand, often speak of their professional
experience caring for patients with intractable suffering.
There is an overwhelming consensus among the proponents
that only suffering arising from medically diagnosable conditions
could ever justify the need for PAD, the sole exception being a
representative from Right to Die Canada who told us during inter-
view that she would also accept suffering from a non-medical
condition as a justiﬁcation (e.g., tiredness of life). Further, mental
illness is discussed less as a source of primary suffering at the end of
life, and more as a potential source of interference with a person's
ability to make a clear and rational decision around assisted dying.
During the SCC hearing, for example, Arvay suggests that any
existing mental co-morbidities (e.g., depression in a context of
cancer) be treated before a patient be granted access to PAD. Finally,
while intractable (physical) suffering could occur at any point in the
illness trajectory, proponents emphasize suffering that occurs in
the last phase of life.
Having described how suffering appears in our data, we now
turn to the ways in which suffering is linked by proponents to the
practices of mainstream curative medicine, palliative care, and
assisted dying.
4.1. The complicity of mainstream curative medicine
Proponents evince an awareness of the larger biomedical
context inwhich the contemporary dying experience is embedded:
that medicine plays an increasingly important role at the end of life.
Citing ﬁgures from Belgium, one EOLC researcher notes that med-
ical end-of-life decisions are now implicated in half of all deaths in
the country. According to this researcher, this means that “doctors
are more and more responsible for decisions that have huge im-
plications on the quality of life of the patients” (interview, Deliens).
While proponents acknowledge that “medicalization” prolongs
life, it does not comewithout concomitant costs. In fact, proponents
argue that it is the medical efforts to prolong life that render the
dying experience difﬁcult. Leslie Laforest, a lay witness with anal
cancer, describes what she sees to be effects of the litany of
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minal illness:
In order for people to maintain life in terminal illnesses, they
very often have to be on wretched volumes of drugs that make
them sick, that make them queasy, that make them extraordi-
narily sad, that sink them into a depression regardless. So then
you're on this whole super highway of trying to balance the
depressants; the drugs that they have to have to keep them alive
is giving them, needs to be counteracted with drugs to try and
lift their spirits like with [antidepressant].
(Interview.)
For Laforest, the interventions necessary to prolong life may be
causing harms that then need to be counteracted with more
medications. She pointedly views the cascade of interventions and
suffering as “ridiculous.” Medicine, in the words of the proponents,
has made life worse for terminally ill patients.
To be sure, proponents understand that the severity of suffering
is, to a large extent, determined by the nature of the illness itself. In
many of the afﬁdavits, seemingly exhaustive lists of symptoms of
various illnesses are presented, enumerated by the proponents to
showcase the enormity of suffering that terminally ill patients
experience. In describing these illnesses, they also express over-
whelming moral disapprobation towards the culture of curative
medicine. In particular, they highlight the inherent life-prolonging
imperative of mainstream curative medicine and the paternalistic
and death-denial attitude of its practitioners. One retired urologist
laments that nowadays “[d]ying naturally is very difﬁcult; there's
almost always a medical intervention at the end of life, because of
the patronizing attitudes of the medical profession, they just want
to keep on treating. The medical profession has been slow to un-
derstand the limits of medicine” (interview, Syme). Another
physician says that in his opinion, “physicians, as a group, do not
sufﬁciently recognize that death is the inevitable end for all of us. I
sometimes think physicians tend to ignore this fact to an even
greater extent than members of the general public” (afﬁdavit,
Welch). Conversely, proponents argue that those physicians who
support PAD are very much cognizant of their own limitations and
humble in the face of death: “But physician-assisted dying? Here
we're talking about people who have a terminal illness who are
dying, and the physician is being humane and is accepting the reality
that we can't ﬁx you” (emphases added, interviewee 26).
Proponents therefore see medicine as increasingly colonizing
ever more parts of the end of life, to the detriment of dying persons.
Indeed, with regards to end-of-life suffering, they lay a great deal of
the blame at the feet of mainstream curative medicine. Proponents
link suffering to the iatrogenic effects of life-prolonging in-
terventions. They argue that these medical interventions are car-
ried outwithin an enabling cultural context where life prolongation
is a moral imperative and physicians are paternalistic and death-
denying, thus further contributing to suffering. Curative medicine,
then, is perceived by proponents to be complicit in the production
of end-of-life suffering. We suggest that blaming, in this context, is
both a moral and political act on the part of the proponents: it
identiﬁes a cause while at the same time obligates a particular
group of actors (i.e., physicians) to redress the wrong.4.2. The limits of palliative care
In Carter, the proponents actively draw limits on what palliative
care could accomplish in terms of relieving suffering. In particular,
they argue that not all pain and symptoms could be alleviated with
palliative care. We note ﬁrst that the majority of proponents areunequivocal in their support for increasing the access and avail-
ability of palliative care. They diverge from opponents, however, in
the latter's position that palliative care can address “the majority, if
not all symptoms that may lead a person to consider ending their
life” (factum, the Catholic Health Alliance of Canada).
Susan Bracken's afﬁdavit describes her husband's experience
dying from metastatic lung cancer in a palliative care ward. In our
interview with her, she explains that the clinicians treating her
husband “have almost all of the means for alleviating suffering. But
there are some that they cannot, I know this is true for a fact
because my husband's pain was terrible, and they were giving him
morphine by pump and everything that he wanted, but he still was
in terrible pain and moaning, and they could not stop the pain”
(interview). Many of the physician-witnesses corroborate such
experience in claiming in their afﬁdavits or during interviews to
have seen ﬁrst-hand in the clinic the failure of palliative care in
alleviating patients' pain and symptoms.
Opponents argue that in cases where patient's pain and symp-
toms are intractable, there is always the option of sedation. While
sedation can be intermittent and of short duration, the type that is
subject to contestation in Carter is what our participants call
palliative or terminal sedation, which is the elimination of patient's
consciousness until death, coupled with the removal of nutrition
and hydration (which both parties recognize as a separate clinical
decision). During the trial, Arvay references studies suggesting that
sedated patients might still be suffering. In one cross-examination
of a palliative care physician, he pushes for the witness to
acknowledge this:
Q: It's fair to say though, given this article and the one I've just
read to you, you can't assure patients, you can't promise patients
that with palliative sedation they will not suffer?
A: I have to think about that for sure.
(Trial transcript, McGregor.)
This excerpt comes at the end of a long exchange inwhich Arvay
tries to press the point that in some cases, palliative sedation may
merely be masking suffering. That is to say, while the intervention
might be efﬁcacious in reducing or eliminating observable signs of
patient's consciousness, patients might in fact still be suffering
intolerably until death.
Our participants argue that despite palliative care's efforts at
holistic intervention (recall Saunders' notion of total pain), there are
non-physical forms of suffering that lie outside of its ambit.
Different participants use different terms to describe this suffering
but the term ‘existential’ is commonly referenced. For Dying with
Dignity, a right-to-die advocacy organisation, existential suffering
results “from profoundly diminished quality of life and a subjective
experience of loss of dignity” (afﬁdavit). Moreover, participants
assert that such existential suffering is felt most acutely by patients
with non-cancer diseases. We think it signiﬁcant that out of the 18
lay afﬁdavits describing witnesses' or their loved ones' illness
experience submitted by the claimants, only two concern cancer.
The rest describes experiences with various neurodegenerative
diseases, such as Motor Neurone disease or ALS. Elayne Shapray, a
woman with Multiple Sclerosis (MS), writes:
The suffering I and others with progressive, degenerative ill-
nesses such as MS endure, is both psychological and social,
involving a loss of autonomy, independence, privacy and ability
to do the things that give joy to one's life. These losses cannot be
meaningfully addressed by any form of palliative care.
(Afﬁdavit, Shapray.)
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by palliative care, Shapray thus construes palliative care as irrele-
vant and unhelpful to her situation. Proponents use existential
suffering as a discursive sign to denote a space of lived experience
that lies outside of the reach of palliative care.
To be sure, there are those on the opposing side who acknowl-
edge that palliative care “is not a panacea when it comes to elim-
inating all suffering. And it would be hubris to think that anything
could eliminate suffering in every instance” (interview, Chochinov).
But for the opponents, the limits of palliative care constitute a
moral Rubicon that should never be crossed. As one of the in-
terveners on the opposing side says, “I think if…you've done
everything you can offer to a patient, and the patient doesn't want
it [sedation], what you say is we've reached the limits of what
medicine can do. But that's [PAD] not within the limits of what
medicine can do. That's outside of medicine” (interview, Physicians'
Alliance against Euthanasia). For opponents, then, the limits of
palliative care themselves mark the very limits of medicine at the
end of life.
4.3. The production of suffering in palliative care
Proponents go so far as to claim that palliative care in-
terventions could exacerbate or prolong suffering. This is striking
because this is the same charge that proponents levy on curative
medicine and strikes a blow at the very heart of palliative care's
professed mission of relieving suffering and counteracting the
harmful effects of curative medicine (McNamara and Rosenwax,
2007; WHO, 2016).
The following exchange between Arvay and a palliative care
physician testifying for the government is illustrative of the pro-
ponents’ strategy. Under a framework of inquiry about typical
palliative care interventions for an ALS patient, Arvay begins by
asking the witness to conﬁrm that “the physician will be able to
explain to the ALS patient that at some point they will suffer pain
for which they will require medication for relief, right?” The wit-
ness conﬁrms that the majority of ALS patients will experience
musculoskeletal pain and that although the ﬁrst line of treatment
would be acetaminophen, not opioids, if pain persists and not
amenable to non-opioid drugs, then “ALS patients will come into an
opioid or a narcotic-type medication at some point.” Arvay then
asks a leading question: “And the family physician would be
qualiﬁed to explain generally the side effects and 10 contraindica-
tions of some of these – some of the medications?” After the wit-
ness responds afﬁrmatively, Arvay points out that one of the
common side effects of narcotics is constipation and counteracting
constipation requires laxatives, which could cause diarrhoea. The
witness afﬁrms that the use of laxatives is sometimes required.
Arvay then moves to another symptom of ALS, incontinence, and
employs a similar line of questioning: incontinence is addressed by
the use of catheters, which could cause bladder infections. Arvay
ends by asking if the physician “will be able to tell this patient…as
he or she comes to the last few months of life they are going to be
dependent on others for all of their care?” The witness, again,
concedes that there will come a time during the illness trajectory
when patients will become paralyzed (trial transcript, Downing).
Here, we see Arvay adroitly guiding the witness through a litany
of problematic side effects produced by the very interventions
meant to palliate the patient's original symptoms (musculoskeletal
pain and incontinence). The overall discursive effect is a manifold
exacerbation of suffering, similar to Laforest's lament on the
mainstream medical interventions needed to prolong life. We are
conscious of the risk of misinterpreting expressions of bodily dys-
functions e or disability for that matter e as suffering. It is clear,however, that proponents see the embodied changes brought about
by illnesses (and their symptoms) along with the iatrogenic effects
of medications or technology as profoundly abject. As the British
Columbia Civil Liberties Association, one of the claimants, tells us,
“an individual who had always taken great pride in being inde-
pendent and adventurous and self-contained might ﬁnd it deeply
painful to have his wife feed him with a spoon…that's what this
lawsuit is about” (interview).
Palliative sedation is further seen by proponents as potentially
causing suffering for those standing vigil. Gloria Taylor writes in her
afﬁdavit of what she believes could happen were she to be sedated
until death: “I believe terminal sedation would horrify and trau-
matize my 11 year-old granddaughter…her mind would be ﬁlled
with visions of my body wasting away while I was ‘alive’…I believe
that would be cruel tomy granddaughter” (afﬁdavit). One physician
says that it’s “absurd” that “we don't allow ourselves as physicians
to give you enough to let you die, but we can put you in a coma and
keep you alive that way, that's a completely undigniﬁed way to end
your life, and it just prolongs suffering for the family, to see you in a
coma for days to weeks” (interviewee 26).
This derogation of palliative care is central to the claimants'
argument that whether “the [patient's] condition is without rem-
edy is to be assessed by reference to treatment options acceptable to
the patient” (italics added, factum), and not by reference to
whether or not treatment options exist per se. Demonstrating that
the interventions of palliative care are unacceptable to some pa-
tients disabuses the notion that proponents are motivated by a
blinkered desire for PAD. One of the government's witnesses, for
example, believes that “the vast majority of [patients who want
PAD] don't know and can't appreciate the full signiﬁcance of the
options they would have if they truly had…really good palliative
care” (interviewee 1). Claiming that “really good palliative care”
could have pernicious effects turns proponents' insistence for PAD
into a seemingly rational, legitimate and necessary EOLC option.
4.4. The signiﬁcance of physician-assisted dying
While there is disagreement among the proponents as to the
scope of physicians' involvement in assisted dying, all agree on the
necessity for the practice to be placed within a medical framework.
The retired urologist we quoted earlier says that he is “opposed to
approaches… to simply make information and medication avail-
able to people outside of a medical framework… This should not be
something which the responsibility should be passed off, which
some people have suggested to thanatologists or lay people who
would carry out this work” (interview, Syme). During the trial, this
emphasis on the role of medicine by proponents is brought into
sharp relief by the Crown Counsel. Recall that the proponents’
equality argument states that persons with disability are disad-
vantaged with regards to access to suicide. At the SCC hearing, the
Crown Counsel remarks that it is “not that some people have a
range of options and other people have none…there are options for
ending life open to everyone, even the most severely disabled.” She
then presents refusal of nutrition and hydration as one example of
those options. The Counsel argues that what the proponents
actually want “is not access to assistance for the usual means of
suicide, what they want is…access to a medicalized suicide” (em-
phases added, trial transcript).
We see the opposing side as narrowly interpreting the pro-
ponents' insistence for themedicalization of assisted dying in terms
of the legal provision of lethal medication. In other words, oppo-
nents often reduce the signiﬁcance of PAD to its ﬁnal act only, the
hastening of death. For example, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition,
one of the interveners supporting the government's position, sees
the question of euthanasia as one of “how are we going to get you
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PAD to its ﬁnal act is concordant with another opponent's view of
the practice as emblematic of “living in a quick-ﬁx society” (inter-
viewee 30).
Proponents do not disavow that placing PAD in a medical
framework means that patients can gain access to the legal au-
thority and technical competency of physicians in administering or
providing (lethal) medication, thus guaranteeing a death that is
quick and free from complications. However, we observe a repeated
emphasis by the proponents on the interactive process, rather than
the ﬁnal act, mandated by a medicolegal regime of PAD and the
ways in which that process can transform suffering at the end of
life.
Proponents argue that placing the practice within a medical
framework places the twinned moral obligations of medicine e
maintaining life and relieving suffering e into conﬂict. On the one
hand, this moral conﬂict functions as an important safeguard. As
one public health researcher says, “I think that's sort of the point of
[the involvement of] medicine is that medicine engages the skep-
tics who aren't really in favour of making this too easy” (inter-
viewee 14). One the other hand, this moral conﬂict has the potential
for improving patient-physician relationship. Proponents argue
that when considering patients' requests for PAD, physicians would
need to expend emotional labour to overcome the ingrained ethical
obligation to maintain life and identify fully instead with patient's
suffering. As one Dutch physician testifying for the claimants says,
physicians “will have to bond with the patient in order to ﬁnd out
what the suffering of the patient really entails…What I meant by
that is that still if you talk unbearable suffering and doctor and
patient join in the decision that there really is unbearable suffering,
there has to be an identiﬁcation of the physician with what the
patient goes through” (trial transcript). Thus, for physicians, placing
PAD within a medical framework is generative of emotional labor
that could reshape patient-physician relationship in important
ways. Furthermore, proponents stress the signiﬁcance of the
regime for patients even if the lethal medication is never used or
obtained by the patient. They argue that a medicolegal regime of
PAD essentially functions as a crucial network of support for pa-
tients. As one lay witness with ALS writes, “[w]hat having the right
to physician-assisted dyingwould do, more than anything, is lift the
isolation and burden I feel as a dying person” (afﬁdavit, Petrie).
5. Discussion
Much of the research on the right-to-die movement focus on the
autonomy argument of the proponents, which is understandable
given that their legal arguments make explicit appeal to autonomy-
based human rights, such as the right to liberty, that are “the
dominant global social justice ideology, the set of tools available to
social justice activists” (Merry, 2014, p. 288). This article asks
instead how PAD proponents articulate suffering with the role of
medicine at the end of life. McInerney (2006, 2007) has studied the
movement's “construction of the contemporary dying as horriﬁc,
intolerable, and beyond the ameliorative powers of medicine and
palliative care” (2006, p. 664). However, her study analyses the
media representation of this construction rather than the con-
struction that emanates directly from the proponents' discourse, as
we do here.
Focusing on autonomy may obscure other important consider-
ations and present an incomplete picture of PAD. Beauchamp
(2006, p. 644), for example, has argued that “this history [of
PAD], still in the making, is a history of expanding commitments to
autonomy.” We argue that the story of PAD is also about the ’par-
adoxical’ use (Richards, 2015) of the framework of the medicali-
zation of dying by the proponents of assisted death in the 21stcentury. In this article, we have used Carter as a ‘critical case’ to
investigate how ‘suffering’ is mobilized by proponents as a
discursive construct to achieve their political goals. We began by
providing background information on the Carter case. We then
discussed the medicalization of dying prior to presenting our re-
sults. In the rest of this section, we reﬂect critically on the data.
We found that proponents construct different relationships
among suffering, mainstream curative medicine, palliative care,
and assisted dying. In the case of mainstream curative medicine,
proponents highlight the profession's complicity in producing end-
of-life suffering through the use of life-prolonging interventions. In
social movement studies, “diagnostic framing” refers to the process
of deﬁning a social problem and focusing blame or responsibility
(Benford and Snow, 2000). Here, proponents fault the cultural
context of medicine where life-prolongation is a moral imperative
and physicians are paternalistic and death-denying. In the case of
palliative care, proponents emphasize its limitations and, like
mainstream medicine, its exacerbation of suffering at the end of
life. In this way, proponents impose a limit to the therapeutic reach
of palliative care that comes to be seen as legitimate and rational,
rather than (merely) politically expedient.
It should come as no surprise that in the debate over legaliza-
tion, proponents see the need to problematize the relationship
between palliative care and suffering in EOLC; if palliative care is
fully capable of alleviating suffering, there would be no need for
PAD. Palliative care professionals have been one of the most vocal
stakeholders in the debate and most of them have voiced public
opposition to PAD. Further, as palliative care developed, it has been
able to claim “measurable and striking successes” (Clark and
Seymour, 1999, 906) in pain and symptoms management. Pro-
ponents claim that such successes need to be qualiﬁed. As our study
participants argue, the ability of palliative care to relieve suffering
has limits which they locate in the suffering of persons with non-
cancer diseases. Indeed, the discursive space taken up by talk and
text of neurodegenerative illnesses by the proponents e via their
discussion of ‘existential suffering’ e is disproportionately larger
than that of cancer considering that evidence from permissive ju-
risdictions shows cancer patients making up the majority of per-
sons requesting and accessing PAD (Smets et al., 2010; Oregon
Health Authority, 2015). Proponents also point out that even in
palliative care's traditional area of strength e cancer care e not all
suffering could be mitigated. Proponents thus charge as illusory
palliative care's goal of addressing ‘total pain’. Proponents even go
so far as to make the bold claim that palliative care interventions
could cause suffering. These interventions range from the con-
ventional use of opioids (as having “10 contraindications”) to the
more controversial use of palliative sedation where proponents
argue that palliative sedation could, in fact, cause additional
suffering in those keeping vigil by the bedsides of dying persons.
Proponents' discourse on palliative sedation merits greater
attention because it has implications for palliative care's claim that
it provides “impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and
other symptoms” to people facing life-limiting illnesses (WHO,
2016). Proponents argue that palliative sedation merely masks,
rather than alleviates, suffering. Citing Morris (1997), Clark and
Seymour (1999) note that palliation used to be a pejorative term
in the medical lexicon due to the double meaning of palliation: one
the one hand, to cloak, and on the other hand, to shield. When used
in the ﬁrst sense, palliationwas seen to be a failing ofmedicine for it
only disguised or covered up symptoms leaving the underlying
diseases untouched. In arguing that palliative sedation only covers
up bodily expressions of suffering while leaving the suffering itself
untouched, we see proponents resurrecting and inscribing the
pejorative sense of palliation to palliative sedation speciﬁcally and
palliative care in general.
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physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia constitute the “ultimate
brakes on the unrestrained use of medical technology at the end of
life” (Salem, 1999, p. 30). In other words, PAD practices “are the
instruments that promote the ‘demedicalization’ of death” (ibid.).
Our analysis shows how such assumption may come to be; pro-
ponents' articulation of suffering with mainstream medicine and
palliative care seemingly point to their absolute rejection. However,
as Salem (1999) has trenchantly argued, it would be a mistake to
adopt this assumption uncritically.
It needs to be made explicit that the Criminal Code makes no
speciﬁc mention of the construct of physician-assisted dying. The
provisions challenged by the claimants collectively have the practical
effect of prohibiting PAD. The claimants did not seek a wholesale
invalidation of those provisions. Rather, they sought a declaration
of invalidity for those provisions only in the context of PAD. We
mention this to highlight the fact that from the outset the claimants
had no intention of advocating for a system inwhich assisted dying
would be placed outside of a medical framework. As the Crown
Counsel made cogently clear in her address to the SCC Justices,
what the proponents wanted was medicalized assisted dying. The
proponents could have pushed for a Swiss-type change in law. In
Switzerland, the act of assisting in another person's suicide is not
illegal so long as it is done without selﬁsh motives (Hurst and
Mauron, 2003). The Swiss regime does not require the participa-
tion of physicians and consequently allows for non-physicians (and
non-healthcare professionals in general) to play an important role.
In Carter, the proponents stress instead the absolute necessity of
the participation of physicians in any subsequent regime. In fact,
looking more broadly beyond Canada, with the exception of
Switzerland, in all places where legal regimes have been instituted,
the social and cultural legitimacy of assisted dying has required it to
be located within a medical framework (Timmermans, 2005). As
Ost (2010, p. 7) aptly observes:
Signiﬁcantly, legal, ethical and social discourses surrounding
assisted dying and laws that have permitted assisted dying have
tended to focus on the assistance of doctors, the provision of
medicine to cause death and medical grounds for requesting
death, that is pain and suffering derived from medical condi-
tions. As such, medicine has provided the main frame of refer-
ences, a vital component of the phenomenon of assisted death.
This, then, suggests to us that the medicalization of dying, far
from being seen as a constraining framework for proponents, is
used by them for constructive ends. This conclusion is supported by
our data whereby the proponents argue that the signiﬁcance of a
PAD regime lies beyond the legal provision of lethal medication. To
be sure, their insistence on medical control is also meant to temper
the fear of harm on the vulnerable. Nevertheless, they emphasize
what they see to be the transformative power of physicians'
involvement in PAD. Proponents argue that in order to satisfy the
due care criteria of a permissive regime, physicians need to form an
empathic bond with patients. From the patient's perspective, such
involvement of physicians e and healthcare professionals more
broadly e could have an alleviating effect on suffering by recon-
stituting and strengthening the dying person's social network, even
if the process does not culminate in the provision or administration
of lethal medication. Indeed, Norwood (2007; 2009) ethnography
of euthanasia in the Netherlands shows how the practice exists
mainly in the form of therapeutic talk and that such talk has the
function of reafﬁrming social bonds by encouraging open dialogue
between patients, families, and healthcare professionals. In this
way, the right-to-die and palliative care movements actually come
to share a “medical-revivalist discourse” in which “death (again)becomes something that should be talked about without embar-
rassment” (Van Brussel, 2014, p. 18).
Medicalization is a widespread phenomenon that has trans-
formed many aspects of social life (Conrad, 2013), including dying.
Reading through the medicalization of dying literature, one cannot
help but be struck by the overwhelming negative tone by authors
on the medicalized forms of contemporary dying (Glaser and
Strauss, 1966, 1980; Halper, 1979; Illich, 1976; IOM, 2014;
McNamara and Rosenwax, 2007; Sudnow, 1967; Timmermans,
2010). In essence, critics argue that the involvement of medicine
at the end of life has served only to increase, rather than attenuate,
suffering. In this article, we've shown how one group of actors not
only reproduces but expands this line of critique to include palli-
ative care. However, it would be a mistake to interpret proponents'
rejection of the status quo as a rejection of medicine. That is, PAD
proponents are not trying to demedicalize the dying process. In fact
we have shown how the proponents use the medicalization
framework for emancipatory ends. While such productive use of
the medicalization framework by other actors has been observed
elsewhere (Conrad, 2013; Torres, 2014), the signiﬁcance of our
ﬁndings and analysis must be considered in light of the fact that the
right-to-die movement emerged historically as a counter-response
to medicalization. Discussing the right-to-die movement and
palliative care, McInerney observes that these were two voices “in
the growing critique of medicine's omniscience in relation to death,
and of the situation for many individuals at life's end” (2000, p.
141). In this article we have shown how such critique by the pro-
ponents of PAD has not resulted in the demedicalization of dying in
the 21st century. We argue that their articulation of suffering with
the role and place of medicine at the end of life must instead be
understood as a discourse through which one conﬁguration of
EOLC comes to be rejected and another accepted, a discourse that
does not at all challenge the larger framework of the medicalization
within which contemporary dying is experienced.References
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